The Rt. Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind KCMG QC MP at the Diplomatic Dinner addressing the CFCC on “THE ARAB SPRING; WHERE IS IT GOING?”
Sir Malcolm was born in Edinburgh in 1946. He was educated at George Watson's College and Edinburgh University where he studied law before taking a postgraduate degree in political science. While at University he took part in an overland expedition to the Middle East and India. He also appeared on University Challenge.
From 1967-69 he lived in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and taught at the local University. He travelled widely around southern Africa and wrote his postgraduate thesis on the Politics of Land in Rhodesia. While in Africa he met his wife, Edith, whose parents had emigrated there when she was a small child. On return to Britain he was called to the Bar and practised as an Advocate until 1979. He was appointed a Queen's Counsel in 1985. During his time at the Bar he appeared in both civil and criminal cases.
In 1970 he fought his first Parliamentary campaign and from 1970-74 he was a local councillor in Edinburgh. In 1974 he was elected as MP for Pentlands and represented that constituency until 1997. Sir Malcolm was appointed to the Front Bench in 1975 but resigned over devolution in 1977. In 1979, when the Conservatives were returned to power under Margaret Thatcher, he was appointed a Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, at first in the Scottish Office and then, at the time of the Falklands War, he was transferred to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, being promoted to Minister of State in 1983. He became a member of the Cabinet in 1986 as Secretary of State for Scotland. In 1990 he became Secretary of State for Transport and in 1992 Secretary of State for Defence. From 1995-97 he was Foreign Secretary. He was one of only four ministers to serve throughout the whole Prime Ministerships of both Margaret Thatcher and John Major. In 1997 he was knighted in recognition of his public service.
He has also been active in a number of voluntary organisations. He is a member of the Dulverton Trust, a Vice President of Combat Stress and a Patron of Raleigh International. He has served on the Court of Edinburgh University and is an honorary colonel. He is a member of the Queen's Bodyguard , the Royal Company of Archers.
Sir Malcolm was re-elected as a Member of Parliament in May 2005 for Kensington and Chelsea. He was elected as Member of Parliament for Kensington in May 2010. He served as the Shadow Secretary of State for Work & Pensions and Welfare Reform until December 2005 when he chose to return to the backbenches. Chairman, Standards & Privileges Committee 2009-2010; Chairman, Intelligence and Security Committee 2010-; UK representative Eminent Persons Group 2010-.
Malcolm and Edith Rifkind have a daughter, Caroline and a son, Hugo, both of whom live and work in London.
For the International Herald Tribune "A Call to Arm Syria's Rebels"
Wednesday, 8 August, 2012
In September 1991, as violence spread through the Balkans, Yugoslavia’s helpless foreign minister, Budimir Loncar, requested that the United Nations Security Council establish a global arms embargo that would apply to all parties in the conflict. His request remains, to my knowledge, the only example of a government demanding that sanctions be imposed on its own country.
In theory, the move was an act of neutrality designed to contain the violence. In fact, the embargo — which I supported at the time — consolidated the Bosnian Serbs’ overwhelming superiority of arms due to their access to the stockpiles of the Yugoslav National Army. Its effect was to make Bosnian Muslim communities much weaker in the face of the Bosnian Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing, illustrated most tragically by the massacre at Srebrenica.
Today, some 20 years after the outbreak of the Balkans wars, Western policymakers are faced with a similar dilemma — whether the provision of arms to a party in conflict will be used in self defense or to commit atrocities and revenge attacks; whether it will hasten the resolution of a conflict or encourage its prolongation. And we are now making the same mistake in Syria as was made during the Bosnian conflict.
I accept that Western military combat in Syria would be mistaken. Unlike the NATO-supported action in Libya, there is no prospect of Russia ending its veto in the Security Council. Nor has the Arab League called for such action, as it did with the rising against Muammar el-Qaddafi.
This does not mean, however, that the United States and Europe can and should do nothing. It was right to try to pursue a diplomatically brokered political settlement through the United Nations, but this process foundered on President Bashar al-Assad’s continued brutality. With the diplomatic route blocked, and Syria’s rebels managing to strike at the heart of the regime in Damascus and Aleppo, the war has moved into a potentially much bloodier phase, which could draw in some if not all of Syria’s neighbors.
We must now consider a series of extremely grim scenarios: fighting in Lebanon inflaming sectarian tensions in that country; the pilfering of Syria’s chemical weapons either by another state or nonstate actor; the total collapse of Syria and a violent free-for-all in the resulting power vacuum.
In order to prevent these possibilities we must press for unity in the Syrian opposition. Structures that encourage communication and cooperation between rebel factions are necessary, both for their war effort and for the period of transition that will follow Assad’s eventual departure.
The longer war drags on, the more likely a legitimate struggle for self-determination will descend further into a cycle of communal violence, poisoning the possibility of a mutually acceptable political settlement. Without such a settlement, Syrian and regional violence will continue — whether the Ba’athist regime survives or not.
It is not sufficient to hector the rebels to “get their act together.” The Americans and the Europeans need leverage, and for leverage they must provide meaningful incentives. This should come in the form of arms supplies to the Syrian insurgents if they can show real progress toward creating a united opposition. This would require a modification of the European Union’s arms embargo. Unlike the U.N. arms embargo in Bosnia, this decision is not at the mercy of a Russian or Chinese veto.
Supplying arms in a civil war will always be controversial and in the short term would lead to greater fighting and more deaths. But it would also ensure the collapse of the Assad regime in weeks rather than months. We should not assume that high-profile defections such as that of Prime Minister Riyad Hijab spell the imminent collapse of the regime — the core of Syria’s security state remains intact. The longer this war lasts the greater overall carnage there will be.
Arming the Syrian insurgents is not an attractive strategy. Providing arms to be used in combat never is. There would be serious risks. But we can already see that the alternative is far worse. The Syrian people need the tools so that they can finish the job of removing this cruel regime.